Papers (Mahani and Bernhardt (2007) and Linnainmaa (2010) ) develop models in which an individual investor rationally chooses to trade speculatively-knowing that most other individuals lose money through speculation-in order to learn whether or not she has the ability to reliably profit through speculation. In these models, investors do not initially know their own abilities and rationally infer these by observing their trading performance. Gervais and Odean (2001) present a model in which biased learning leads successful investors to become overconfident. In this model, too, investors do not initially know their own abilities and must infer these from performance. However, when they are successful, these investors irrationally attribute success disproportionately to their ability rather than luck, leading investors to overestimate their own abilities and trade too aggressively; even investors with more past failures than successes may become overconfident by overweighting their successes.
We test the predictions of rational Bayesian learning models by analyzing the performance of day traders in Taiwan. We focus on day traders, those who buy and sell the same stock within a day, as these traders are almost surely speculators. Using the complete transaction data for the Taiwan Stock Market over 15 years (1992 to 2006) , we find evidence of learning among day traders. The majority of day traders quit relatively quickly (more that 75% of all day traders quit within two years), and poor performers are more likely to quit. These results are consistent with the models of both rational and biased learning. In this respect, our paper complements the emerging evidence that learning is an important factor in the behavior of individual investors. Using Finnish data, Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman (2010) Furthermore, the size and quitting effects are stronger early in an investor's career, when his or her prior beliefs about ability are more diffuse. Using US broker data, Nicolosi, Peng, and Zhu (2009) show that trade intensity increases following signals of strong performance. Analyzing data from the National Stock Exchange in India, De et. al. (2010) document that investors increase trading in response to recent profits and that the sign of profits matters more than their magnitude.
Previous tests of rational learning models of trading have focused primarily on confirming evidence, e.g., do investors increase (decrease) trading in response to successful (unsuccessful) trades? To properly test these models it is, however, equally or more important to also look for disconfirming evidence. While we, too, find clear evidence of learning, we also document behavior that is not consistent with rational Bayesian learning as modeled by Mahani and Bernhard (2007) and Linnainmaa (2010) for two reasons:
First, if the entry (and exit) of new speculators who are testing their trading acumen is stable over time, then the sign of the expected lifetime profits of new speculators is the same as that of aggregate speculator profits. Therefore risk-averse or risk-neutral potential speculators with no special prior knowledge of their abilities should only "trade to learn" if aggregate speculator profits are positive. In fact, using complete data for the Taiwan market, the aggregate performance of day traders net of fees is negative in each of the 15 years that we study. A profit-maximizing risk-averse (or riskneutral) Bayesian investor would not enter a market if her expected lifetime profits were negative.
Second, though performance affects day trader survival, many poor performing traders persist. Each month from 1993-2005, we sort traders based on the number of days they have engaged in day trading as of the end of the previous month and on the past profitability of their intraday trades. To have an accurate measure of day trading experience, we exclude traders who day traded in 1992. Previously unprofitable traders with 50 or more days of past day trading experience have a 95.3% probability of day trading again in the next 12 months, while previously profitable traders with 50 or more days of past day trading experience have a 96.4% probability doing so. So, not only do experienced day traders with histories of losses persist in day trading, they do so at nearly the same rate day traders who have been profitable. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After reviewing related research (section I), we discuss Taiwan market rules, data, and methods (section II). In section III, we present the performance of day traders sorted in aggregate and partitioned by past performance and trading activity. In section IV, we explore the source of profits for profitable day traders. In section V, we explicitly test the learning models. After discussing our results (section VI), we make some concluding remarks (section VII).
I. Learning by Speculators
The suggestion that investors learn from experience is neither novel nor controversial.
1 Learning is a ubiquitous feature of human experience. From a welfare and policy perspective, the question is not whether investors learn, but how well they learn.
In this section we develop testable predications that emanate from a rational model of learning and highlight the predictions would discriminate between rational and biased models of learning. Mahani and Bernhardt (2007) argue that rational Bayesian learning can explain several empirical regularities: cross-sectionally, most speculators lose money; large speculators outperform small speculators; past performance positively effects subsequent trade intensity; most new traders lose money and cease speculation; and performance shows persistence. Similar to Mahani and Bernhardt (2007) Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman (2007) , Nicolosi, Peng, and Zhu (2009 ), Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Shreman (2010 ), Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2010 , De, Gondhi, and Pochiraju (2010) , and Odean, Strahilesvitz, and Barber (2010) .
In Mahani and Bernhardt (2007) H1: The aggregate net performance of day traders is positive (non-negative).
The alternative is that the aggregate net performance of day traders is negative. This is consistent with traders holding biased prior beliefs about the unconditional expected lifetime profits from trying day trading.
In the rational learning models, unsuccessful traders quit trading after the accumulation of negative signals outweighs their positive initial prior beliefs about their ability. Gervais and Odean (2001) quit. We present evidence of remarkable trading persistence in the face of losses, for example, nearly 3/4ths of day-trading volume is generated by unsuccessful day-traders with at least 10 days of day trading experience. The reader must assess for him or herself whether this perverse persistence is due to biased prior beliefs, biased learning, or both.
The rational learning models predict that unsuccessful speculators will quit while successful speculators are likely to persist. Thus-irrespective of prior beliefs-the rational learning models predict our second null hypothesis:
H2: Experienced day traders with previous net losses will not continue to trade.
Under Gervais and Odean's biased learning model, it is possible for unsuccessful traders to become overconfident, and more active traders, if their learning bias is sufficient. Thus continuing to trade by unprofitable day-traders is contrary to the rational learning models but consistent with biased learning.
II. Data and Methods

II.A. Day Traders and Speculative Trading
Empirical tests of the learning models must identify traders who trade speculatively. Investors might reasonably trade to save (or consume), to rebalance their portfolios, or to reduce their tax liability. Thus, an important feature of our empirical strategy is to identify a clean sample of speculators. We do so by focusing on day trading on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Day trading is the purchase and sale of the same stock by an investors on a day. We argue that these intraday trades are almost certainly speculative. Moreover, day trading is common and prevalent in Taiwan.
We are not the first to study day trading, though the sample of day traders we study is much larger and the time-series much longer than those in prior studies. 2 The one exception to this generalization being Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2010) who identify a small subset of day traders (less than 1% of the day trading population) predictably earn profits. None of these prior studies used the empirical setting to test rational and biased models of learning, the focus of our investigation.
II.B. Taiwan Market Rules
Before proceeding, it is useful to describe the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE). The TSE operates in a consolidated limit order book environment where only limit orders are accepted. During the regular trading session, from 9:00 a.m. to noon during most of our sample period, buy and sell orders can interact to determine the executed price subject to applicable automatching rules. 3 Minimum tick sizes are set by the TSE and vary depending on the price of the security. Generally, orders are cleared using automatching rules one to two times every 90 seconds throughout the trading day. Orders are executed in strict price and time priority. An order entered into the system at an earlier time must be executed in full before an order at the same price entered at a later time is executed.
Although market orders are not permitted, traders can submit aggressive price-limit orders to obtain matching priority. During our study period, there is a daily price limit of 7% in each direction and a trade-by-trade intraday price limit of two ticks from the previous trade price.
Since our analysis focuses on day trading, an important consideration is transaction costs. The TSE caps commissions at 0.1425% of the value of a trade. Some brokers offer lower commissions for high-volume traders. Officials at brokerage firms and the TSE indicated to us that the largest commission discount offered is 50% (i.e., a commission of roughly 7 basis points); these same officials estimated the trade-weighted commission paid by market participants to be about 10 basis points. We use the 10 basis points when calculating returns net of fees. Taiwan also imposes a transaction tax on stock sales of 0.3%.
II.C. Trades Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use a unique and remarkably complete dataset, which contains the entire transaction data, underlying order data, and the identity of each trader on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE). With these data, we provide a comprehensive accounting of the We define day trading as the purchase and sale, in any order, of the same stock on the same day by an investor. Specifically, if an investor buys and sells the same stock on the same day, we calculate the number of shares bought (S b ), the number of shares sold (S s ), the average purchase price (P b ), and the average sales price (P s ). involves the purchase and sale of the same number of shares in a stock over the course of one day (i.e., most day trades yield no net change in ownership at the close of the day).
Virtually all day trading can be traced to individual investors. In the average month, individual investors account for over 99% of all day traders (and 95% of day trading volume). Individuals and corporations are free to short sell, though dealers, mutual funds, and foreigners are prohibited from doing so on the TSE. These short sale restrictions might partially explain the tendency for day trading to concentrate among individual investors. In contrast to U.S. markets, dealers are not active providers of liquidity. TSE rules state that dealers are required to "efficiently adjust the demand and supply in the market depending on the market situation, and ensure that the formation of fair price and its sound operation are not harmed," yet dealers face no specific penalties for failing to meet this requirement. Dealer trades emanate from their proprietary trading activity. Based on our discussions with dealers in the TSE, the majority of this proprietary trading is not necessarily intended to provide liquidity. Chae and Wang (2003) also report that TSE dealers are not net providers of liquidity. In the remainder of the paper, we focus on individual investors.
In Figure 
II.D. Performance Measurement
Our primary performance measurement focuses on the intraday profits of all trades made by day traders and on trade-weighted intraday returns. In a subsequent analysis, we also analyze the event time profitability of purchases and sales to ensure the inferences we draw from the analysis of intraday profits are accurate.
We first calculate the intraday returns to day trading. To do so, we identify all trades made by day traders. We calculate the profits on round-trip day trades and other 
III. Rational and Behavioral Learning Models: Confirming Evidence
We begin by estimating the survival rate of day traders. Our trading data starts in 1992. To reasonably ensure that we are analyzing new day traders, we restrict our analysis to those who begin day trading after 1992. Our data ends in 2006 and thus is right-censored. We consider a trader to have quit day trading if we observe no day trading for 12 consecutive months. As a result of this requirement, we do not analyze day traders who begin day trading in 2006 since we cannot reliably observe whether they have quit.
In Figure 3 , we present a five-year Kaplan-Meier survival function. We consider the survival of day traders who have day traded for at least 10 days -and designate the first month when they hit the minimum 10-day threshold as their entry month.
For many of these traders, day trading is a persistent activity. Only 2.5% drop out within one month, while survival rates at one, two, and three years are 44%, 24% and 15% respectively.
To test whether magnitude of past profitability affects the decision to quit day trading, we estimate the following Cox proportional hazard rate model,
, where X is a matrix of independent variables, B is a vector of 6 Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2007) and Linnainmaa (2005) include measures of past day trading activity: the log of the number of days with day trading activity, the log of the number of days since a trader's first day trade, and the log of the total volume of day trading. In the event history analysis, all independent variables are updated monthly.
The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 4 . The horizontal axis of the figure represents net intraday return categories, while the vertical axis represents the hazard rate relative to the omitted profit category (net intraday return in the interval (0, 0.05]). As predicted by the learning models, the net intraday return is negatively related to the hazard rate. More profitable day traders are less likely to quit.
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However, the effect is not linear. The propensity to quit is relatively insensitive to differences past net intraday returns in the -30 bps to 30 bps range. Traders with past net intraday returns in the (30 bps, infinity) range are more likely to quit than those with 7 The relation between profits and the propensity to quit is similar regardless of whether we include control variables. However, the control variables are all reliably related to hazard ratios at the 1% significance level. Traders with more days of day trading experience are less likely to quit; a one standard deviation increase in the log of number of days of past day trading reduces the base case hazard rate to 0.43. Day traders who have been trading longer are more likely to quit; a one standard deviation in the log of the number of days since a trader's first day trade increases the hazard rate to 1.24. Heavy day traders are more likely to quit; a one standard deviation increase in the log of past day trading volume increases the hazard rate to 1.11.
returns in the -30 bps to 30 bps range, though not as likely as traders with more negative returns.
In the domain of negative returns, the propensity to quit is quite sensitive to the magnitudes. For example, consider the impact on hazard rates of moving across four The first move, from just profitable to the low range of losses increases the hazard rate six percentage points (from 1.00 to 1.06); the second move, from the low range of losses to mid range losses, increases the hazard rate by an additional 30 percentage points (from 1.06 to 1.36), the third move, from the mid range of losses to a high range increases the hazard rate by an additional 36 percentage points (from 1.36 to 1.72).
In summary, these analyses provide strong evidence that traders learn about their own ability by trading. Those who profit are less likely to quit, though the effect is most pronounced for those with steep losses.
III.A. Rational Learning Models: Disconfirming Evidence
To this point, we find support for the rational and behavioral learning models of investor behavior. Poor performers are more likely to quit day trading.. The confirming evidence indicates learning is an important feature of financial markets. In this section, we argue that rational learning does not explain behavior of the large population of speculative investors for three reasons: aggregate performance is negative, experienced speculators lose money, and unprofitable speculators persist.
A. 1. Aggregate performance is negative
To evaluate the performance of day traders relative to their opportunity cost of holding the market portfolio, we estimate abnormal returns by regressing the portfolio excess return (portfolio return less risk-free rate) on the excess return on a valueweighted market index. We construct our own market index using market capitalization from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) and individual stock returns calculated from the TSE data. The intercept of this regression is our measure of abnormal returns.
In Table 1 , we present the gross and net performance of all day traders. Though our performance analysis weights investors by the investments they make, we do not distinguish occasional day traders from active day traders in this preliminary analysis.
We analyze the day trades and other trades of these investors in the months in which they day trade.
There are two reasons that including all trades in the month of day trading might positively bias our performance analysis. First, due to the disposition effect, day traders are more likely to close profitable positions. Thus, months in which we observe day trading are more likely to be profitable months. Second, it is possible that good investment performance leads to day trading (i.e., reverse causation). (In subsequent analyses, we identify day traders ex-ante to avoid these issues.) We are not concerned by these biases in this preliminary analysis since we document poor performance in aggregate.
In the second column of Table 1 , we present the gross abnormal intraday returns of day traders. On average, day traders lose 7 basis points on their day trading before costs (t=-10.2). In the fourth column we see that trading costs more than triple the losses to 23.9 basis points per day. Moreover, we observe reliably negative gross and net performance in all years but 1992.
In aggregate, day trading is a losing proposition; day trading is an industry that consistently and reliably loses money. From an industrial organization perspective, it is difficult to understand how such an industry survives. For people to knowingly day trade, most must either be overconfident about their prospects of success or derive non-financial utility from the activity and knowingly suffer losses as a result. Finally, the poor aggregate performance of day trading is not consistent with the learning model of Mahani and Bernhardt (2007) . In their model, novice speculators lose while the experienced profit, but aggregate performance should be positive and represent the equilibrium return to day trading. We discuss this issue in detail and explicitly test rational learning models after presenting results on cross-sectional variation in performance.
A. 2. Experienced Day Traders Continue To Lose Money
A central feature of the learning model is the observation that bad traders quit. experience, we exclude traders who day traded in 1992. We exclude traders with fewer than 10 days of past day trading experience sorting the remaining traders into those with 10 to 49 days, 50 to 99 days, 100 to 199 days, 200 to 399 days, and 400 or more days of day trading experience. We further partition these experience groups into those with positive cumulative past intraday profits and those with negative or zero cumulative past intraday profits. We then measure the propensity for traders in each experience/profitability group to stop day trading for one month or for twelve consecutive months. What fraction of day trading can we trace to traders with a history of losses? To answer this question, each month we sort traders who day trade that month into three groups: occasional day traders-traders with 1 to 9 days of day trading experience; unprofitable day traders-traders with 10 or more days of day trading experience and negative (or zero) life time net intraday profits (prior to the month of sorting); profitable day traders-traders with 10 or more days of day trading experience and positive life time net intraday profits (prior to the month of sorting. In Figure 5 we graph the relative sizes of these three groups from 1995 through 2006 when measured by number of traders ( Figure 5a ) and trading volume in dollars (Figure 5b ). Throughout this twelve-year period the fraction of profitable day traders is consistently about 5%. The fraction of unprofitable traders grows to over 2/3rds as more and more occasional day traders are reclassified as profitable or unprofitable. As one would expect, profitable and unprofitable day traders account for proportionately more trading volume that occasional day traders. In aggregate over the sample period, unprofitable traders account for 72% of trading volume and in the last several years of the sample they consistently account for about 80% of trading volume.
Thus, most day traders are unprofitable, most day trading is generated by previously unprofitable traders, and unprofitable day traders with considerable experience persist at day trading at almost the same high rate at profitable experienced day traders.
These observations are not consistent with models of rational learning.
A. 3. Event Time Analysis and the Persistence of Performance
So far we considered only intra-day returns. This is appropriate given our focus on day trading. However, not all positions initiated by day traders are closed the day they are opened. Do day traders earn profits on positions that they hold beyond the close of trading? We address this question with an event time analysis of returns subsequent to purchases and sales.
Each day we sort traders on profitability and experience over the last 365 calendar aggregate all purchases by day traders in each group by stock and day where the day of the transaction is event day 1. We then calculate the mean market-adjusted abnormal return on event day τ (MAτ) (weighted by the value of stocks bought) using purchase prices and closing prices to calculate event day 1 market adjusted returns and ignoring trading costs. There is a similar calculation for the sales of each group. Finally, we calculate the cumulative (market-adjusted) abnormal return on stocks bought less the cumulative (market-adjusted) abnormal return on stocks sold as:
The results for a 10 trading day event horizon are displayed in Figure 7 . The most striking results in the graph are: 1) irrespective of experience, traders with past profits outperform those with past losses and 2) for traders with positive past profits, cumulative abnormal returns increase with experience, and 3) profitable traders with more than 40 days of day trading experience in the last year earn more than enough to cover 40 basis points of round trip transaction costs. Most of this profit is earned on the day of the transaction.
We look at the persistence of profitability from another angle by calculating, as in Table 1 , gross and net abnormal intraday returns. We partition day traders daily using the same criteria as for Figure 6 . Results are reported in Table 3 . 1) Irrespective of experience, traders with past profits outperform those with past losses, 2) for traders with positive past profits, cumulative abnormal returns increase with experience, and 3)
profitable traders with more than 40 days of day trading experience in the last year earn more than enough to cover their transaction costs.
These results confirm that an extensive history of profitability is a strong predictor of future profitable. However, very few traders are predictably profitable. In the last column of Table 3 , we see that only 9.81% (3.20%+6.61%) of day trading volume is generated by predictably profitable day traders. From column 8, we can calculate that these predictably profitable traders constitute less than 3% of all day traders on an average day.
IV. Discussion
Our data are remarkably well suited for testing models of rational learning such as Mahani and Bernhard's. Mahani and Bernhard write that their "prototypical novice speculator is the Japanese hairdresser Kiyoshi Wakino" who day trades between giving haircuts (p. 1317). We observe the day trading of hundreds of thousands of investors over a seventeen-year period. And while our day traders are Taiwanese and certainly not all hairdressers, it is probable that-like Kiyoshi Wakino-many of our novice day traders pursue trading in addition to, if not during, a regular job. Despite the size and appropriateness of our data, our results simply do not support the rational learning models. In Mahani and Bernhard's model, day trading is, in aggregate, profitable because skilled day traders are able to take advantage of the insensitivity of liquidity traders to price and the willingness of competitive market-makers to forego a profit. In Taiwan, day traders, in aggregate, lose money. Therefore it is not rational for a risk-averse investor with no special claim to superior ability to undertake day trading in hopes of discovering that he is amongst the chosen few. Furthermore, it is not rational for day traders who have incurred persistent losses to continue day trading for the purpose of learning about their ability.
So why do investors take up day trading and why do so many persist in the face of losses? We consider three broadly defined answers to this question.
First, it could be the case that day traders do not have standard risk-averse preferences; they may be risk-seeking or attracted to investments with highly skewed investments, such as lotteries, that have negative expected returns but a small probability of a large payoff as suggested by Kumar (2009) . However, the day trading profits that we document are similar in magnitude to, and far less prevalent than, the losses. Unlike lottery winners, day traders must succeed on repeated gambles in order to achieve overall success. Such repeated gambles do not tend to generate highly skewed distributions.
Furthermore, daily day trading returns have a negative mean, and yet lower variance and less right-hand skewness than the average Taiwanese stocks. Define the annual day trading return as the sum of the returns earned on each day of day trading. For traders with a minimum of ten days of day trading, the skewness of the annual return is -0.22 (i.e., modestly negatively skewed). In contrast, when we calculate the skewness of annual returns across individual stocks listed on the TSE from 1981 to 2009, the coefficient of skewness is positive in all but one year and averages 2.36. Thus, a risk or lottery seeker could better maximize his utility, with far less effort, by simply buying and holding a single volatile stock.
Second, day traders may be overconfident in their prior beliefs about their abilities and biased in the way they learn. Several papers (e.g., Odean (1998 Odean ( , 1999 , Odean (2000, 2001) ) argue that overconfidence causes investors to trade more than is in their own best interest. Overconfident day traders may simply be bearing losses that they did not anticipate. While novice day traders undoubtedly realize that other day traders lose money, stories of successful day traders may circulate in non-representative proportions, thus giving the impression that success is more frequent than it is. Once investors undertake day trading, their prior overconfidence may be reinforced through biased learning as in Gervais and Odean (2001) . Furthermore, heavy day traders, who earn gross profits but net losses, may not fully consider trading costs when assessing their own ability.
Third, day traders may trade for non-financial motivations including entertainment, a taste for gambling, and the desire to impress others (see, e.g. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009)). Some investors may enjoy the process of day trading so much that they are willing to persist in the face of regular losses. Some investors may be attracted to the casino like qualities of day trading with its frequent bets, wins, and losses. 8 Some investors may choose to day trade in hopes of impressing others.
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We are unable to explicitly test whether day traders are motivated by overconfidence rather than the desire for entertainment, gambling, or to impress others.
Nor is there reason to believe that overconfidence and non-financial motivations are mutually exclusive. Quite to the contrary, entertainment, gambling, and the desire to impress others are all likely to be more attractive reasons to trade if one is overconfident about one's likelihood of success.
In Mahani and Bernhard's model, "all speculators are made worse off if some speculators are slightly overconfident" (p. 1315). Our results are consistent with this prediction. If heavy day traders persist in trading due to overconfidence, then that overconfidence is detracting from their own welfare and that of other speculators. The welfare of the heavy traders themselves is diminished because, on average, they earn net losses; the welfare of other speculators is diminished because, on average, heavy traders
8 Kumar (2009) shows a correlation between the propensity to gamble and the types of investment decisions U.S. investors make. Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2008) document that the introduction of a National Lottery in Taiwan coincided with a significant drop in trading volume on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) document that investors prone to sensation seeking trade more frequently. 9 Several papers argue that investment decisions are influenced by social concerns, for example, Barber, Heath, Odean (2003) , Statman (2004) , and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). earn gross profits thereby reducing the average returns of other investors. The beneficiaries of this overconfidence are brokerage firms-through commissions-and the government-through the transaction tax.
V. Conclusion
We test predictions of models of learning by rational traders and find clear evidence that the decision to continue or increase day trading is influenced by previous day trading returns. Nevertheless, rational models of learning do not explain all or even most day trading. The most experienced day traders lose money and nearly 3/4ths of day trading can be traced to traders with a history of losses. Persistent trading in the face of losses is inconsistent with models of rational learning. So, too, is the decision to try day trading when ex-ante expected lifetime profits are negative. For prospective day traders, "trading to learn" is no more rational or profitable than playing roulette to learn.
APPENDIX: Details of Return and Profit Calculations
We calculate the intraday return from day trading on day t for a particular group we do not know the extent to which traders use leverage, which would increase the magnitude of returns for both gains and losses, but again the sign of the gains and losses would be the same as those in our calculations. In summary, the sign of the day trading returns that we calculate is accurate, though the magnitudes may differ because of sequential trading or the use of leverage.
When we calculate net returns and net profits, we deduct a 5 bps commission for all trades (10 bps round-trip commission) and a 30 bps transaction tax for sales. Put differently, buys cost 5 bps (C b ) and sells cost 35 bps (C s ). We also increase the capital requirements to reflect the total cost of the opening positions:
Continuing our example from above, the net return for the trader would be:
.
Note the net return (2.09%) is roughly 40 bps (the total round-trip trading costs of 10bps in commissions and 30 bps in transaction tax) less than the gross return (2.50%). The shortfall is slightly greater than 40 bps because we also increase the capital required to open the positions. The numerator in equation A2 is the intraday net profit of trader i on day t. Day trading is defined as round-trip trades by the same stock/investor/day. In panel A, we present percentage of traders who day trade in month t-1 but not in month t. In Panel B, we present percentage of traders who day trade in month t-1 but not in months t through t+11 We sort traders on experience (rows) and profitability (columns).
Experience is the number of previous days on which a trader has day traded through month t-1. Only traders with 10 or more days of day trading experience are included. Profitable day traders are those with mean daily intra-day returns that are positive through month t-1. The analyses begin in 1993 and exclude traders who day traded in 1992. N is the number of trader/month observations. Day Traders are grouped based upon how many days they engaged in day trading and whether their intraday returns were profitbale during the previous 365 days. The alphas are estimated using the following regression of intraday daily returns: (Rpt -Rft) = αp + βp(Rmt -Rft) + εpt, where Rpt, Rmt, and Rft are the portfolio return, market return, and riskfree return (respectively). The gross day trading return is calculated from daily round-trip trades plus the intraday returns on open trades; an open trade is a trade made during the day that results in an outstanding position at the close of the day. The net day trading return assumes a 10 bps round-trip commission and a 30 bps transaction tax on sales. "Day Trade / All Trade" is the fraction of the group's trading that is round-trip day trades. The last two columns present the share of total market day trading and all trading accounted for by each group.
Figure 1: Day Trading as a Percent of Total Volume and Number of Individual Day Traders
The figure presents the 12-month moving average for (1) the number of individual investors who engage in day trading and (2) day trading as a percent of total trading volume. Observations are monthly and exclude traders who day traded in 1992. Traders are considered to have quit day trading in the first month for which we observe no day trading in twelve consecutive months. The figure reports the hazard ratio for quitting and the 95% confidence interval (dashed lines) for different return categories relative to the default category of (0, 5 bps] where the hazard ratio is equal to one by construction. The sample consists of day traders with a minimum of 10 days of day trading. The entry month is the first month when they exceed 9 days of day trading. Returns are the average net daily intraday returns from the month of the 1 st day trade to the end of prior month. Occasional day traders are those with 1 to 9 days of past day trading. Profitable (unprofitable) traders are traders with 10 or more days of past day trading whose cumulative intraday net profits are positive (negative or zero). 
